Which way will the Constitutional Court go?
This is a pivotal moment for the composition of Colombia’s Constitutional Court. Justice José Fernando Reyes, aligned with the “defense of institutions” bloc, will soon resign, leaving a critical vacancy. To fill it, the Supreme Court has nominated Patricia Balanta, Carlos Camargo and Jaime Humberto Tovar. The contest is essentially between Balanta, strongly backed by the Pacto Histórico and the administration of President Gustavo Petro, and Camargo, whose candidacy—though lauded for independence—is clouded by potential conflicts of interest linked to his past tenure as government ombudsman. If Camargo’s election were annulled, the government could appoint a “temporary” -- de facto permanent -- justice, strengthening its influence. If the Senate were to break a tie, government influence might throw the seat to Balanta. Under that scenario, the pro-Petro bloc would increase from three justices to four, tilting the balance on rulings concerning pension reform, no-reelection provisions and even the prospect of a new constitutional assembly.
The stability of Colombia’s institutional framework is being further tested by the weakening of its Armed Forces, scrutinized in a recent piece by political scientist Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. Although Colombia maintains one of Latin America’s largest militaries—3rd regionally and 17th globally in terms of troop size—its overall military strength has declined to 46th globally. Key drivers include the degradation of air capabilities, obsolete communications, poor intelligence, reduced troop numbers, excessive personnel costs and weak inter-service coordination. The grounding of Russian Mi-17 helicopters, the deteriorating Black Hawk fleet and failures in logistical planning have severely impaired tactical mobility. From a peak of 242,000 personnel in 2012, active forces dropped to 181,000 by 2025, for a 27% decline. Budget distortions, particularly a rise in subsidies and pensions, further crowd out investment in weapons and technology. Yet homicide rates have declined, a trend Pizarro attributes to police expansion, and the enormous efforts of mayor and governors. We also consider a third, more worrisome possibility: that mob bosses, discovering that murder is “bad for business,” may have reined in killings.
Institutional fragility is a backdrop in the forthcoming presidential elections, planned for May 31st, 2026. Though National Registrar Hernán Penagos stated at an August 26th press conference that no disruption of social peace or exceptional circumstance could lead to suspension or postponement of the elections, the very need for such declarations reflects deep tensions. In October 2025, six coalitions will hold intra-party primaries, feeding into inter-party contests aligned with congressional elections in March 2026. On the left, Pacto Histórico and Frente Amplio will choose the two candidates to compete in March for the pro-Petro-coalition. In the center, another two coalitions may choose candidates from so-called regional candidates and the center-center names. On the right, Centro Democratico and another unnamed coalition could choose from a set of center-right independents. Prominent figures such as Vicky Dávila, Claudia López and Germán Vargas remain outside the October primaries, but retain notable voter support. With publication of polls prohibited by law until November, we look to social media as indicators of political momentum.
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